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FEDERAL ASBESTOS LEGISLATION:
WRESTLING WITH THE MEDICAL ISSUES
Patrick M. Hanlon*
INTRODUCTION
Asbestos litigation began in earnest in the 1970s, and the
first proposals to substitute a federal compensation scheme for
the tort “system” came almost at the same time. 1 These
proposals and the many that followed in the succeeding decades,
came to nothing. The failure of legislative reform was not due to
the grand success of the tort system. On the contrary, as early
as 1991, the U.S. Judicial Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee on
Asbestos Litigation found that the situation with respect to
asbestos litigation “has reached critical dimensions and is getting

∗

Patrick M. Hanlon is a partner in the Washington Office of Goodwin
Procter LLP, where he concentrates on litigation and government affairs. He
represent the National Association of Manufacturers, which has been one of
the main participants in the debate over comprehensive asbestos reform, and
he was a participant in many of the events discussed here. The views
expressed in this paper are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of his
firm or his clients. A version of this paper was presented at the Brooklyn
Law School Science for Judges Program on November 4, 2006.
1
The first hearings on asbestos litigation occurred in the 1970s, and
from the late 1970s through 1985 asbestos legislation was a perennial item on
the Congressional calendar. Congress then fell silent on the issue. The U.S.
Judicial Conference’s Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation strongly
recommended legislation in 1991, but that recommendation lead only to
hearings⎯no bill was introduced. Serious efforts at asbestos legislation did
not begin until after the Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). See Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne M. Smetak,
Asbestos Changes, 62 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 525, 557-564 (2007)
[hereinafter “Asbestos Changes”].
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worse.” 2 According to the Ad Hoc Committee:
Dockets in both federal and state courts continue to
grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long; the
same issues are litigated over and over; transaction
costs exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two to
one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the
process; and future claimants may lose altogether. 3
The Ad Hoc Committee’s call for legislation fell on deaf ears.
The future foretold by the Ad Hoc Committee came to pass.
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Amchem, Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), put an end to hopes of creating
an administrative claims mechanism through a broad class action
settlement, asbestos litigation exploded. 4 New claims were being
filed at a rate approaching 100,000 per year. 5 Many of these
claims were concentrated in courts new to the litigation, such as
Holmes County, Mississippi, which saw unprecedented verdicts
for people who had physical indications of asbestos exposure but

2

REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2 (1991).
3
Id. at 3.
4
The Supreme Court in Amchem noted almost plaintively that, while the
“argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims
processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of
compensating victims of asbestos exposure,” Congress “has not adopted such
a solution.” Amchem, Inc. v. Windsor, 421 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997). This
was the first of several occasions in which the Supreme Court rejected the
invitation to create special asbestos law to control the burgeoning mass of
asbestos cases and called upon Congress to adopt a comprehensive reform.
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (“Like
Amchem . . . this case is a class action prompted by the elephantine mass of
asbestos cases, and our discussion in Amchem will suffice tos how how this
litigation defies customary judicial administration and calls for national
legislation.”) (internal citations omitted); Norfolk & Western Ry Co. v.
Ayers, 548 U.S. 135, 166 (2003). For a comprehensive account of the
aftermath of the Amchem decision, see Asbestos Changes, supra note 1, at
548-56.
5
STEVEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 71, Tbl. 4.1
(RAND Institute for Civil Justice 2005) [hereinafter “RAND REPORT”].
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no current breathing impairment—the so-called “unimpaired.”6
Increasingly, asbestos claims were solicited all over the country
and then channeled to plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions through
sophisticated networks of plaintiffs’ lawyers. 7 The sudden
escalation in asbestos litigation led to a wave of bankruptcies
beginning in 2000. 8 By the end of 2002, the vast majority of
major asbestos defendants had filed for protection under the
bankruptcy laws. 9 The total number of asbestos bankruptcies
exceeded 70, and more than two-thirds of these were filed after
January 1, 2000. 10 The absence of traditional defendants
accelerated pressures to bring new ones into the litigation, and
the RAND Corporation estimated that by the end of 2002 the
litigation had involved 8,400 companies throughout the
American economy. 11
This deteriorating situation transformed Congressional
attitudes toward asbestos litigation. By early 2003, there was a
bipartisan consensus that the asbestos litigation system was
6

In one such case, a Mississippi jury awarded $150 million in
compensatory (not punitive damages) to 6 men who plainly had no current
impairment. See R. Parloff, $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice, FORTUNE
166 (May 4, 2002).
7
Asbestos Changes, supra note 1, at 552-53.
8
Id. at 555-56.
9
The magnitude of the early 21st century asbestos bankruptcies can be
illustrated by looking at the list of defendants in the seminal 1970s case
against the asbestos industry, Borel v. Paper Prods. Fibreboard Corp, 493
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). Almost all of those defendants had gone bankrupt
by 2002. (Fibreboard Paper Products Co & Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp.
(2001), Johns Manville (1982), Pittsburgh Corning (2000), Philip Carey
Corp. (part of Celotex bankruptcy, 1990), Armstong Cork Corp. (Armstrong
World Industries 2001, ACandS 2002), Ruberoid Div. of GAF (G-I
Holdings, 2002), Standard Mfg and Insulating Co. (1986), Unarco Industries
Inc. (1982); Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. (1991); Combustion Engineering
(2003)). While many companies that eventually became important defendants
were not parties to Borel, the mortality rate of those that were parties
indicates the economic impact of asbestos litigation on the affected
companies.
10
RAND REPORT, supra note 5, at 69, 152-53. (Table D.1, collecting
asbestos bankruptcies through 2004)
11
Id. at 79.

HANLON.DOC

1174

7/11/2007 6:24 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

broken and needed fixing. There was, as yet, no consensus on
what to do.
The primary forum was the Senate. Because Senate rules
allow a minority with 41 votes to prevent consideration of
legislation, that body was considered the more difficult hurdle. 12
The House had little interest in taking up the asbestos issue if
any legislation approved by the House would be blocked in the
Senate. The Senate considered two approaches. The “medical
criteria approach” would have made a limited number of
changes to address the most significant abuses of the tort
system. 13 The heart of this concept was the adoption of medical
criteria that would have prevented the “unimpaired” from
pursuing claims and would have tolled the statute of limitations
to ensure that asbestos victims could still sue when they became
sick. 14 Medical criteria legislation was advocated by many
defendants and insurers, a portion of the asbestos plaintiffs’ bar
that specialized in representing cancer claimants, and the
American Bar Association. 15 It was opposed by the AFL-CIO,
12

Standing Rule XXII(2) provides for the closing of debate on matters
other than amendment of Senate rules if “three fifths of the Senators duly
chosen and sworn” vote for a so-called “cloture motion.” Normally threefifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn are 60—which means that 41
votes are enough to block cloture. Historically, the failure to shut off debate
meant that senators would stay up all night reading the phone book in a
classic filibuster. Today’s Senate is less colorful and more efficient. When it
becomes clear that a matter cannot proceed, the majority leader will generally
withdraw it rather than waste scarce legislative time in useless debate. During
the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses (2001-2006) the Senate was always
closely balanced between Republicans and Democrats and was for a brief
period controlled by Democrats. Asbestos reform was perceived as primarily
a Republican initiative. The Senate could not adopt an asbestos bill of any
kind unless it appealed to enough Democrats (and commanded the support of
enough Republicans) to overcome a filibuster.
13
S. 413 (108th Cong. 2003), introduced by then Sen. Don Nickles (RAZ), was the main vehicle in the Senate incorporating the “medical criteria”
approach.
14
Id. at §§ 4.6.
15
A legislative proposal involving the “medical criteria” approach was
negotiated in 2001 among representatives of the American Insurance
Association, the “Asbestos Alliance” led by the National Association of
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most asbestos (and other) trial lawyers, and some large
defendants and insurers who advocated a more radical change. 16
The second approach involved developing a federal
administrative compensation scheme that would for practical
purposes substitute for the tort system. That approach—clearly
what the Supreme Court had in mind in calling for national
legislation—was proposed by the “Asbestos Study Group” or
“ASG” and had the support of insurers with large asbestos
liabilities. 17 Since the trust fund idea was in principle congenial
to the AFL-CIO, it had the potential to attract support from
some Democrats. However, another key Democratic
Manufacturers, and plaintiffs’ lawyers representing cancer victims, led by
Steven Kazan of Oakland. Kazan presented the case for this approach before
the Senate Judiciary Committee in September 2002.Asbestos Litigation:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 188-89 (2002)
(Statement of Steven Kazan).The ABA’s House of Delegates adopted a
resolution supporting federal legislation establishing medical criteria at its
mid-year meeting in February 2003. Resolution Adopted by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association (Feb. 2003) (on file with author).
See also Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Hearing before the Senate Comm. On the
Judiciary 21, 108th Cong. 61 (2003) (testimony & written submission of
Dennis Archer, President-Elect of the American Bar Ass’n);.
16
See Asbestos Changes, supra note 1, at 562-64; Patrick M. Hanlon &
Anne M. Smetak, Asbestos Reform in the States, Materials Presented in ALIABA Conference on Asbestos Litigation in the 21st Century 1-18 (Nov. 30Dec. 1, 2006) (discussing the “reform analysis” underlying medical criteria
and other proposed tort system changes as implemented in the states).
17
The “Asbestos Study Group” or “ASG” led the business interests
seeking an administrative compensation system. The ASG included such
companies as General Electric, Pfizer, Dow, Honeywell, Halliburton (prior
to 2004), General Motors, and Ford. Several insurance companies who were
major players in asbestos litigation also supported proposals for an
administrative system, although as the panic of 2002 abated, some early
supporters of the trust fund concept dropped away and (in the case of Liberty
Mutual) even came to lead the opposition. See, for example, S 3274: The
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, Hearing before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, June 7 2006 (Statement of Edmund F.
Kelly, Chairman and CEO of Liberty Mutual Group) available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1931 (last checked May 31,
2007); 152 Cong. Rec. S753 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2006) (Liberty Mutual
member of coalition paying about $3 million to defeat the FAIR Act)..
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constituency, the trial lawyers were united in their opposition to
an administrative compensation program.
In March 2003, Senator Orrin Hatch, then chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, chose to press for an administrative
compensation scheme which was eventually dubbed the “FAIR
Act.” 18 The Hatch bill was approved by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in July 2003 with amendments that were nearly
fatal. 19 The bill was nursed back to life through an extraordinary
mediation effort by Judge Edward R. Becker of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 20 Judge Becker
volunteered his time at the request of Senator Arlen Specter (RPA), who subsequently became Chair of the Judiciary
Committee in 2005. Between 2003 and 2006, Judge Becker
presided over more than 50 meetings among stakeholders,
brokering compromises on many issues, and recommending fair
solutions of many others to Senator Specter. 21 The bill that
18

FAIR stands for “Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution.” There have
been several versions of the FAIR Act: S. 1125 (2003), S. 2290 (2004), S.
852 (2005) and S. 3274 (2006). S. 852 was the version eventually brought to
the Senate floor in February 2006, and S. 3274 was introduced 3 months
later with changes designed to address some of the objections to S. 852.
Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong.,
2006. For convenience, this paper generally refers to S. 3274 unless
otherwise indicated.
19
See Sen. Rep. 108-18 (July 21, 2003). The most important issues are
discussed in Patrick M. Hanlon, Commentary: The FAIR Act: A Freeze
Frame, Mealey’s Asbestos Bankruptcy Report v. 3, no. 1, 37, 46-48 (August
2003).
20
152 Cong. Rec. S5398 (daily ed. May 30, 2006) (resolution
recognizing accomplishments of Judge Edward R. Becker).
21
Id. In August 2003 the author attended the first meeting over which
Judge Becker presided. That meeting was followed by scores of meetings and
conference calls. It was an extraordinary experience. At one moment the
group would be buried in detail, and then it would be debating broad
questions of policy, with Judge Becker all the while encouraging, cajoling,
brokering, listening, arbitrating, leading. If the stakeholders did not succeed
in reaching consensus, the failure was not Judge Becker’s. The disagreements
were too deep, and the stakes too large. During all this time Judge Becker
was fighting his own losing battle with cancer. He died in May 2006, to the
deep sorrow of those who knew him.
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ultimately went to the floor in 2006 was a bipartisan bill,
sponsored both by Chairman Specter and Ranking Member
Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and much different from the bill
introduced by Senator Hatch in 2003. 22
The FAIR Act reached the floor of the Senate on February
6, 2006. 23 On February 14 (St. Valentine’s Day), it was
defeated by one vote on a motion to waive a point of order that
required 60 votes. 24 Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) was absent
for personal reasons and would have voted in favor of the bill
had he been present. 25 The bill had bipartisan support: 15
Democrats joined 44 Republicans in voting to waive the point of
order. 26 Those numbers show, however, that the bill had strong
bipartisan opposition as well. The key to the bill’s defeat was
strong opposition by a group of at least 11 conservative
Republican senators who might normally have been expected to
vote for tort reform legislation. 27 While these senators had a
number of concerns, the most important was a fear that the
administrative compensation program would eventually cost far
22

Compare S. 852 (109th Cong.) with S. 1125 (107th Cong.).
152 CONG. REC. daily ed. S697 (February 6, 2006) .
24
Id. at S1168-69.
25
The margin of defeat may have been somewhat larger than one vote.
Several Republican Senators who voted to waive the point of order are
rumored to have done so because they were unwilling to challenge the Senate
leadership and thought that the bill would fail anyway. Some of those
senators might have changed their votes if the outcome had been riding on
them.
26
Id at S. 1168. This count includes in the Democratic column of
supporters Senator Jeffords, an Independent who caucused with the
Democrats. After the decisive vote the Majority Leader, Senator Bill Frist
(R-TN) changed his vote on waiving the point of order from “yea” to “nay”
for reasons of parliamentary procedure. (This allowed him to move to
reconsider the vote later). The vote tally in the text includes Senator Frist as
among the bill’s supporters; in fact he was one of the bill’s principal
champions.
27
Id. The Republicans who voted to uphold the point of order killing the
bill were Senators Bunning (KY), Crapo (ID), Demint (S.C.), Ensign (NV),
Graham (SC), Gregg (NH), Inhofe (OK), McCain (AZ), McConnell (KY),
Sununu (NH), and Thune (SD). As noted above, Senator Frist voted against
waving the point of order only after the motion had already failed.
23
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more than its advocates expected (or, some thought, admitted)
and would become a federal financial responsibility. 28 The
nightmare of these senators was the possibility that the FAIR
Act would evolve in the same manner as the federal Black Lung
program. 29 As we shall see, the “Black Lung Issue” ultimately
killed the bill because it was impossible to arrive at an
agreement on scientific issues regarding the appropriateness and
effect of the bill’s eligibility criteria.
This Article examines the attempts of the bill’s sponsors and
critics to address (or, in some cases, get around) these scientific
issues. Those attempts were exceedingly difficult for two
reasons. First, there were strong disagreements within the
scientific community on medical issues, and each side of the
political debate distrusted judgments of experts associated with
the other side—in part because of the entanglement of so many
experts in the litigation. Second, it was hard to assess the effect
of any particular eligibility criteria in a brand new administrative
context. For example, eligibility standards that worked well
28

These concerns were most clearly expressed by Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
fomer director of the Congressional Budget Office, in a hearing on S. 3274,
which was introduced in May 2006 in an effort to overcome the problems
that had blocked S. 852 in S. 3274: The Fairness in Asbestos Injury
Compensation Act of 2006 (S. 3275), Hearing before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary (June 7, 2006) (Statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1931.
29
The leading study on the Black Lung Act is PETER S. BARTH, THE
TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE (1987). Barth points out that congressional supporters of the Black
Lung program consistently underestimated the costs of the program, id. at
283, and the coal excise taxes that were designed to shift program costs to
the industry never were sufficient to offset the costs of legacy (pre-enactment)
claims. Id. at 48-49, 190-92; see also Edward Rappaport, The Black Lung
Benefits Program, CRS Report for Congress 4-6 (June 12, 2002). While the
program has generally performed much more soundly since reforms in the
early 1980s, the Federal Treasury has continued to be burdened with
substantial costs. See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Black Lung
Program: Further Improvements Can Be Made in Claims Adjudication 7-8,
GAO/HRD 90-75 (1990). As a result of its early runaway costs, Black Lung
has come to symbolize the fiscal dangers that may be created by federal
injury compensation programs. BARTH, supra, at 284.
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enough in the context of tort settlements would not necessarily
work the same way in a no-fault administrative compensation
program with radically lower transaction costs. 30
In Part I, I will show why developing politically acceptable
medical and exposure criteria despite profound distrust of the
medical experts was a central challenge for the framers of
asbestos compensation legislation. After explaining the basic
structure of the FAIR Act in Part II, I will turn in part III to an
analysis of the various strategies used to resolve, or avoid
having to resolve, the important medical questions and the
difficulties that each of those strategies entailed. As we shall
see, despite considerable political creativity, at the end of the
day the effort to resolve or evade the medical issues generated
problems that eroded confidence in the bill and contributed to its
demise.
I. WHY IS THIS SO HARD?
The FAIR Act was an effort to substitute a compensation
system based on cause for one based on fault. 31 Compensation
would be based not on the responsibility of any particular
defendant but on whether the claimant had an asbestos-related
disease. Conceptually, if not in the details of its operation, the
FAIR Act resembled workers’ compensation, where the question
of fault is replaced by work-relatedness. The problem, however,
was that the amount of compensation provided by the FAIR Act
was much higher than is usual in cause-based programs.
Politically, therefore, the FAIR Act would only be acceptable to
defendants and insurers (and their supporters in the Congress) if
the overall cost were controlled by (1) reductions in transaction
costs (especially the fees of plaintiff and defense attorneys), (2)
30

These and other problems encountered by the FAIR Act in its tortured
history are discussed in greater detail in Patrick M. Hanlon, Elegy for the
FAIR Act, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 518 (2006) [hereinafter “Elegy”].
31
For this distinction see Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman,
Private Insurance, Social insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision
of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 78-79
(1993).
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elimination of substantial compensation for tens of thousands of
people who had some physical manifestation of asbestos
exposure but were otherwise quite well, and (3) eligibility
criteria that would preclude unexpectedly high claiming rates.
In a perfect world, the adequacy of the bill’s eligibility
criteria would be a question of medicine. One would look to
independent and impartial doctors to draw the necessary lines (as
was done in the case of cancers other than mesothelioma and
lung cancer). In this imperfect world, however, that was easier
said than done. Over a 25-year period, in which $70 billion had
already changed hands, it was very difficult to find doctors
generally regarded as “independent” and “impartial.” Most
prominent experts in asbestos medicine had long since taken
sides, and many depended on the litigation for a substantial part
of their income. Moreover, the FAIR Act could only work if the
eligibility criteria were kept simple and objective, and it is the
almost universal tendency of doctors (not to mention lawyers) to
want to make informed judgments based upon a consideration of
all the relevant factors. A judgment-based system, however,
would not only have high transaction costs, but would make
everything depend on which physicians were making the
judgments (which all too often was thought of as a question of
which side’s physicians were making the judgments).
Thus, the fate of the FAIR Act necessarily depended on how
well it could solve the problem of developing politically
acceptable medical criteria despite profound distrust of the (other
side’s) medical experts. As discussed below, the Senate used
every means at its disposal to do this. In some instances it was
able to defer medical questions to the National Academy of
Science’s Institute of Medicine (IOM), one of the few
organizations that enjoyed a general (though not universal) level
of trust on all sides. In some instances it was able to rely on
general compromises made in the tort system through what I
will call a “settlement” model. And in some cases, it simply
punted medical issues to Physicians Panels for case-by-case
resolution (notwithstanding the inefficiencies that would have
introduced into the administrative process). Much of what was
done was ingenious, but, at the end of the day, it was not
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enough.
II. THE FAIR ACT’S BASIC STRUCTURE
The FAIR Act, had it been enacted, would have established
an administrative scheme for the compensation of asbestosrelated diseases. 32 The program would have been administered
by an administrator in the Department of Labor, and would have
been paid for by assessments on asbestos defendants and
insurers. 33
The program was designed to be a no-fault compensation
system with an emphasis on efficiency. Because the system was
“no-fault,” it would no longer have been necessary for claimants
to link their disease with any defendant. 34 It would, however,
still have been necessary to show that the claimant’s disease was
actually caused by asbestos.
The administrative provisions of the FAIR Act were for the
most part hammered out in discussions between representatives
of organized labor, defendants, and insurers. The administration
would have been non-adversarial, reflecting the point of view of
the AFL-CIO. In some medical categories, compensation would
have been extremely fast and certain. For example, claimants
for mesothelioma (a deadly cancer whose only known cause is
asbestos exposure) would have been able to recover based only
on a reliable diagnosis of mesothelioma and evidence of some
identifiable exposure to asbestos. In other categories, however,
claims would have been subject to more searching scrutiny. For
example, household (or “take-home”) exposure claims for
diseases other than mesothelioma would have been considered
by a Physicians Panel for an individualized determination of

32

S. 3274, § 2 (b).
S. 3274, §§ 101 (b) (appointment of Administrator), 202 (a)
(defendant funding), 212 (a) (insurer funding). The bill would also have
swept into the program the assets of bankruptcy trusts, which are successors
to the liabilities of defendants that have been reorganized under the
bankruptcy laws. Id. § 402 (f).
34
S. 3274, § 112 (2006).
33
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causation. 35 The underlying concept was to provide relatively
light review in situations where the probability of error was
small and more searching scrutiny in situations that were more
problematic.
The FAIR Act emphasized the importance of ensuring the
quality of the data used in the administrative process. 36 All
medical tests had to meet applicable standards regarding
equipment, testing methods and procedures. 37 Diagnoses of noncancerous conditions had to be based on physical examinations
performed by a diagnosing physician and x-rays read by a
qualified B-reader, and they also had to consider exposure and
smoking history. 38 All information provided in support of a
claim was subject to audit, 39 and there were specific
requirements for the auditing of B-readings and smoking
assessments. 40 The Administrator also had the authority to
request additional information, including new x-rays or CT
scans. 41
The bill provided for outreach by the Administrator to

35

Id. § 121 (c) (3). The typical “take-home” exposure occurs when a
worker brings asbestos home on his clothes, and his spouse is exposed while
doing the wash. These cases can also involve the worker’s children. See
Patrick M. Hanlon and Elizabeth Runyan Geise, Asbestos Reform—Past &
Future, MEALEY’S LITIGATION REPORTS: ASBESTOS.v. 22, no. 5, at 43-44
(April 4, 2007)
36
Quality control of the data submitted in support of an application was
especially important because of the history of medical fraud and abuse that
has made asbestos litigation such a scandal. See generally the comments of
Judge Janice Graham Jack, In re Silica Products Liability Litigation, 398 F.
Supp. 2d 563, 596-637 (S.D. Tex. 2005), which emphasize the similarity
between silica and asbestos litigation in this regard.
37
S. 3274, § 121 (b) (3).
38
Id. § 121 (b) (2) (A) The physical examination and B-reading
requirements (but not the smoking-history requirement) were excused for
deceased claimants. Id. § 121 (b) (2) (B).
39
Id. § 115 (a) (1).
40
Id. §§ 115 (b), (c). The auditing of B-reader reports is not just a
system function but can affect individual claims.
41
Id. § 121 (b) (3).
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inform potential claimants of the availability of the program. 42
Claimants did not have to be represented by attorneys, and
attorneys’ fees were limited to 5 percent of the claimant’s
recovery. 43 Adverse decisions by the administrator were
reviewable in the Court of Appeals for the area where the
claimant resided when his application was filed. 44
The bill would have established nine disease “levels” with
exposure and medical criteria and an award value for each one.
Occupational exposure was generally required for all disease
categories other than mesothelioma, 45 although as discussed
below, people with non-occupational exposures could recover in
some circumstances. The statutory disease levels are summarized
in Table 1.

42

Id. §§ 104 (a), 225 (b). The bill also provided for a medical screening
program whose primary purpose was to identify potential claimants. See
generally id. § 225(c).
43
See S. 3274, § 104 (e). S. 3274 would have allowed a reasonable fee
in excess of 5 percent in the event of a successful administrative appeal. Id. §
104 (e) (1) (B). The attorney fee limitation did not apply to judicial review.
44
Id. § 302(a).
45
The occupational exposure requirement is incorporated into the
medical criteria of each of the disease levels from I to VIII. Id. §§ 121 (d)
(1)-(8). Level IX—Mesothelioma does not require exposure to be
occupational. Id. § 121 (d) (9) (B).
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Table 1: Disease Levels and Award Amounts Under the S. 852
Level I – Unimpaired Non-Malignant Conditions receive
reimbursement for medical monitoring but no monetary
compensation
Level II
Mixed
Level VI
Obstructive–
$25,000
$200,000
“Other Cancer”
Restrictive
Disease
Level III
Level VII
$300,000[s]
Asbestos
Lung Cancer
$100,000
$725,000[x]
Disease with
without
$800,000[n]
impairment
Asbestosis
Level IV
Asbestos
Level VIII
$600,000[s]
Disease with
Lung Cancer
$925,000[x]
$400,000
with Asbestosis $1,100,000 [n]
More Severe
Impairment
Level V
Asbestos
Level IX
Disease with
$850,000
$1,100,000
Mesothelioma
Most Severe
Impairment
Note: Smoking status, indicated by [s] = smoker, [x] = former
smoker, and [n] = non-smoker.
Claimants who did not meet the exposure and medical
criteria for any disease level could seek compensation on the
basis of an individualized review by a Physicians Panel as an
“exceptional medical claim.” 46 Several kinds of claim that
present special difficulties of proof were also sent to the
Physicians Panels. These included claims based on “take-home”
exposures and claims for cancers other than mesothelioma and
lung cancer. 47
46
47

Id. § 121 (g).
Id. § 121 (c). In litigation, most of “take home” situations involve
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Although the bill referred to the various disease categories as
“levels,” that only meant that award values increased from level
to level. For example, a claimant with lung cancer might be in
Level VII or Level VIII. The difference in compensation
between those two categories does not relate to how sick the
claimants are, but to the strength of their causation evidence.
Similarly, a person who qualified for Level II could be much
more seriously impaired than many who qualified for Level III.
The difference in compensation is due to the fact that most
Level II cases will be primarily due to chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease (e.g., emphysema or chronic bronchitis, both
caused by smoking) with relatively weak evidence of an asbestos
connection, while Level III cases have a clearer link to asbestos
exposure.
The FAIR Act would have been financed by defendants (up
to $90 billion), insurers (up to $46.25 billion), and asbestos
trusts established as a result of chapter 11 reorganizations of
previous defendants such as Johns Manville (expected to amount
to $4 billion). 48 The defendants’ contributions were based on a
complex and exception-riddled set of formulas that took into
account (1) whether they were in bankruptcy or not (the
bankrupts paid more), (2) how large their previous asbestos
expenditures had been, and (3) how big they were (measured by
gross revenues). 49 The insurers’ contribution would have been
determined after enactment by an Asbestos Insurance
Commission. 50 The bill would have channeled essentially all of

mesothelioma claims. The bill did not require those claims to be referred to a
Physician’s Panel, but did it require an individualized determination of
causation when other diseases are involved. For “other cancer” claims, see
infra notes 65-73.
48
S. 3274, §§ 202 (a) (1) (defendants), 212 (c) (2) (insurers), 402 (f)
(trusts). Section 402(f) requires transfer of substantially all trust assets (which
would have exceeded $4 billion), but payments made into trusts established
after a certain date would have been subject to credits against the defendants’
and insurers’ obligations. Id. § 420 (f) As a result, the estimated proceeds
from the trusts were fixed at $4 billion.
49
Id. §§ 202-205.
50
Id. § 212.
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the trusts’ assets for the payment of future bodily injury claims
into the national fund. 51
Since the funding for the FAIR Act was capped at about
$140 billion, it was extremely important to be sure that this
amount was enough. Compared to the expected cost of the tort
system, funding seemed ample. Respected estimates of future
costs of the tort system as of 2002 were in a range of $130 to
$195 billion—and that was a system in which almost 60 percent
of the total cost went to lawyers and experts for both sides. 52
The FAIR Act’s non-adversarial structure should have greatly
reduced transaction costs (essentially eliminating the defense side
in favor of a more efficient administrative structure and
significantly restricting claimants’ costs). Moreover, between
2002, when the cost estimates were made, and 2006, when the
FAIR Act came to a vote, several billion dollars had been spent
in settling claims or paying judgments, presumably reducing the
amount of future claims that would be addressed by the bill. All
of this presumed, however, that claiming in the administrative
system would resemble claiming in the tort system. That in turn
depended on how the bill’s eligibility criteria would work in
practice.
If the expectations of the bill’s sponsors were disappointed,
and the Fund ran out of money, the bill required the program to
sunset. 53 However, many senators, especially conservative
opponents, believed that future Congresses would not allow the
program to end once it became established. 54 The general lack

51

Id. § 402 (f).
As of 2002, past costs were approximately $70 billion and estimates
of total costs ranged from $200 billion (Tillinghast) to $265 billion
(Millman). Thus, estimated future costs ranged from $130 to $195 billion.
These were, of course, in nominal dollars, not present value. RAND Report,
supra note 5, at 92, 105. The RAND Report estimated that historically only
42 percent of the money spent on asbestos litigation reached plaintiffs—the
rest was spent on transaction costs, primarily defense costs and plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees. Id. at 104.
53
S. 3274, § 405 (f).
54
See testimony of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, supra note 28. The author
often encountered similar views in discussions with members and staff.
52
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of faith in the sunset provisions of the bill put even more
pressure on certainty that the bill’s eligibility criteria would
work as expected.
III. CONTESTED GROUND
A. An Overview
At the outset, it is useful to consider how eligibility
requirements and award values ought to be set. There are at
least two basic approaches: the medical model, where eligibility
criteria are based on the best medical evidence, and the
settlement model, which bases eligibility on the practices
followed in the tort system except where Congress believes
those practices should be overridden for policy reasons. 55
The FAIR Act mainly followed the settlement model.
Because asbestos was a mature mass tort, what claimants
received in the tort system would be at least the point of
departure for determining the fairness of award values.
Moreover, fundamental disagreements on medical issues tended
to discourage compromise, while the use of a settlement model
based on previous compromises tended to facilitate it.
Nevertheless, several difficulties arose from the use of the
settlement model to establish eligibility. First, because the model
is built on compromise, the bill was always open to the
accusation of paying people who should not be paid or not
paying people who should be (based on partisan views of the
medical evidence). 56
55

Elegy, supra note 30, at 550-51.
For an excellent expression of this disquiet, see S. REP. NO. 108-18,
at 98-103 (2003) (Additional Views of Senator Jon Kyl). Senator Kyl’s
summary of the medical issues was based upon statements from very well
respected doctors and scientists—all of which were associated with the
defendants’ point of view. See id. The opinions of those doctors were
rejected by many other well respected doctors and scientists who were
associated with the plaintiffs’ point of view. See id. To rely on one set of
doctors rather than another is more or less what a jury does when it decides
for the plaintiff or the defendant. That approach doesn’t lend itself to a
56
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Second, settlement patterns in the tort system tend to reflect
typical situations, while legislation must be drafted to deal with
situations that may be rare in litigation but are important to
members of Congress. Thus, for example, there are very few
cases in the tort system that involve non-occupational exposures
(if “take-home” exposure is considered occupational), but nonoccupational exposure is, as shown below, an explosive political
issue.
Third, the settlement model reflects settlement practices
based on a particular state of medical technology. 57 But the
FAIR Act was designed to last for 50 years or more.
Technological change will inevitably change the assumptions on
which model settlement patterns were based. The controversy
over CT scans, discussed below, illustrates this difficulty.
With these overarching considerations in mind, we shall turn
to two difficult areas—the Act’s medical categories and proof of
exposure.
B. The Medical Categories
Not all of the medical categories of the FAIR Act were
controversial. For example, one of the pillars of the FAIR Act
was its choice to provide only medical monitoring, and not
monetary compensation, for unimpaired non-malignant claims
(Level I). 58 This policy was probably the most important
override of tort system practices. Other medical categories were
also mostly uncontroversial. 59 The controversy revolved around
“mixed” obstructive-restrictive disease (Level II), “other
cancers” (Level VI), and lung cancer without asbestosis (Level
VII).

legislative process based on coalition building where the stakes are large and
the science unclear.
57
S. 3274, § 131 (b) (1).
58
Id.
59
Uncontroversial categories include mesothelioma (Level IX), lung
cancer with asbestosis (Level VIII), and most non-malignant diseases (Levels
III through V). Elegy, supra note 30, at 551-52.
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1. Level II: Mixed Obstructive-Restrictive Disease
The theory behind Level II is that for some people asbestosrelated “restrictive” diseases may contribute to impairment that
is caused primarily by chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
Standard pulmonary function tests do not detect such dual-cause
impairment. 60 In the tort system, such cases receive, if anything,
much lower settlements than claims involving impairment that
has a clearer relationship to asbestos-related disease.
The tort-system compromise was carried over into Level II
under the FAIR Act. The award value for that category was
only $25,000. 61 However, while the bill’s general approach to
Level II had roots in the tort system, its specific criteria were a
60

The bill relied upon two pulmonary function tests. One, “total lung
capacity” or “TLC” measures the total volume of the lungs including both
“vital capacity,” the volume of air a person breathes in and out, and the
“residual volume,” which is the volume of air that is always in the lungs.
Obstructive lung disease often increases TLC, because an increase in the
residual volume due to the trapping of air in the lungs more than compensates
for a reduction in vital capacity. Since the bill detected impairment by a
reduction in total lung capacity, it was theoretically possible that overinflation would offset the reduction in lung capacity due to asbestosis, thus
disguising an impairment that is in part asbestos-related. See Scott Barnhart,
et al., Total Lung Capacity: an Insensitive Measure of Impairment in Patients
with Asbestosis and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease?, 93-2 CHEST
299 (1988). The other major way of determining impairment was to look at
“forced vital capacity” or “FVC”), basically the amount of air a person can
exhale with maximum effort. FVC decreases in the case of both obstructive
and restrictive disease. However, the ratio between the amount of air people
can exhale in the first second (called FEV1) and the total amount they can
exhale tends to decrease if obstructive disease is present. INTERMOUNTAIN
THORACIC SOCIETY, CLINICAL PULMONARY FUNCTION TESTING 6 (2d ed.
1984). The FAIR Act would have weeded out obstructive disease by
imposing a limit on the permissible decline of FEV1/FVC. But that decline
just shows the presence of obstruction; it does not necessarily exclude the
possibility that a restrictive disease such as asbestosis may make some
contribution to the overall fall in forced vital capacity.
61
By comparison, a claimant who qualifies for Level III (which involves
less impairment but a greater probability of asbestos causation) would receive
$100,000. S. 3274, § 203 (g) (2) (C).
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troubling product of legislative bargaining. The principle
underlying Level II was supposed to be that mixed obstructiverestrictive disease should be inferred when the x-ray evidence of
an asbestos contribution is especially strong. For that reason, the
minimum ILO score to qualify for compensation was set at
1/1—one step higher than the minimum abnormal reading of
1/0. 62 However, it was still possible to qualify for Level II
based on pleural plaques (which do not involve any scarring of
lung tissue), without any asbestosis at all. 63 Moreover, an ILO
score of 1/1 was a relaxed test for showing that an asbestosrelated condition contributed something to impairment related to
obstructive lung diseases. The American Bar Association’s
recommended medical criteria, adopted in 2003, would have
required an ILO score of 2/1 or higher in a similar situation. 64

62

S 3274, § 121 (d) (2). The ILO system for reading chest x-rays was
initially developed for the purpose of assuring consistency in epidemiological
studies of lung diseases, but it has been widely used as a diagnostic tool in
administrative and judicial proceedings relating to a variety of lung
conditions. People qualified on the basis of an examination to apply the ILO
system—so-called “B” readers—look at the profusion, size, shape, and
location of opacities on x-ray films. Profusion is the concentration of small
opacities in a unit area in an x-ray film. It may indicated interstitial fibrosis—
scarring in the parenchyma or tissue of the lung—while location and size and
shape provide an indication of whether scarring is due to asbestos, silica, or
other causes. Profusion is rated on a 12 point scale in the form of A/B. A is
the B reader’s final judgment on the degree of profusion, with 0 being
normal and 3 being most abnormal. B indicates whether the reader considered
rating profusion one more or less than the score shown by A. Thus, for
example, a 1/0 reading indicates that the reader decided that profusion was a
“1”—, the minimum abnormal level—but seriously considered the possibility
that it was a “0”—normal. A 1/0 x-ray is therefore the lowest abnormal
level. A 1/1 x-ray, in contrast, is unambiguously abnormal, but still involves
a relatively low level of profusion. The use of the ILO classification system
is described in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR
THE USE OF THE ILO INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF RADIOGRAPHS OF
PNEUMOCONIOSES, REVISED EDITION 2000 at 3-6 (2002).
63
See S. Rep. 109-97, at 100.
64
In February 2003, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
recommended the adoption of medical criteria legislation that would defer the
claims of the unimpaired. See ABA Standard for Non Malignant Asbestos
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2. Level VI “Other Cancer”
While the evidence is clear that asbestos causes lung cancer
and mesothelioma, other cancers are arguably due to asbestosis
as well. Some of these cancers are very common, while others
are rare. 65 The epidemiological evidence in favor of general
causation is relatively weak for all of these cancers, but it is
strong enough as a practical matter to allow “other cancer”
cases to get to a jury in many jurisdictions. Thus, depending on
the jurisdiction, these cases have settlement value. 66
Level VI presented in acute form the problem of reconciling
medical and settlement models. Since Level VI cancers had
value in the tort system, the settlement model suggested that
they should be compensated—if on a discounted basis—under the
Act. And in fact, the bill provided as a default option that Level
VI cancer claimants would receive $200,000, a small fraction of
the amount received for lung cancer or mesothelioma. The
medical model, however, suggested that some or all of the
“other cancers” should receive nothing at all.
Related Disease Claims February 2003. Such legislation necessarily results in
binary, “go” and “no-go” decisions: it is impossible to compromise by
discounting awards. An objection to medical criteria is that it rules out the
claims of people who are impaired by obstructive disease but who have a
strong case that there is some asbestos contribution to their impairment. To
address this situation, the ABA recommended allowing plaintiffs to pursue
their cases in court if they had sufficiently strong radiographic evidence of
asbestosis (an ILO reading of 2/1). Id. at 1-2.
65
By far the most prevalent of the “other cancers” is colorectal cancer.
See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2006, 4 (2006).
According to the American Cancer Society, an estimated 148,610 new cases
of cancer of the colon or rectum will be diagnosed in 2006. Id. The estimated
incidence of the other cancers in Level VI is 8,950 (pharynx), 14,550
(esophagus), 22.800 (stomach), and larynx (9,510). Id. These rates are for
both sexes. Since substantial asbestos exposure took place primarily among
males, it is also useful to look at incidence among men: colon and rectum
(72,800), pharynx (6,820), esophagus (11,260), stomach (13,400), and larynx
(7,700). Id.
66
For this reason, “trust distribution procedures” of bankruptcy trusts,
which tend to reflect settlement practices, compensate most or all of the
Level VI cancers.
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In most instances, the FAIR Act followed the settlement
model and did not attempt to resolve medical issues. With
regard to the “other cancers,” however, it took a different tack.
There were three reasons for this. First, because “other cancer”
cases were rarely pursued in the tort system, those who saw
themselves as claimant advocates did not have a strong reason to
resist forcing the medical issues. Second, the defense side feared
that the a no-fault system might attract a large volume of claims
that currently were not made in the tort system. Because some
of the “other cancers”—especially colon cancer—were common,
the financial consequences of a significant increase in claims for
“other cancer” could threaten the viability of the entire program.
Thus, defendants and insurers were willing to press for a
medically based decision. Finally, each side was confident that a
neutral arbiter would favor its position.
Thus, the FAIR Act would have required the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences (“IOM”) to
study the scientific literature on causation and to determine
which if any of the Level VI cancers could be caused by
asbestos. 67 If the IOM decided that a particular cancer was not
caused by asbestos, that cancer could no longer be compensated
under the Act. 68
As it turned out, Senator Specter, the bill’s Republican cosponsor, secured an appropriation to fund the IOM study in
anticipation of enactment of the bill. Through a contract with the
National Institutes of Health, the IOM established a committee
to determine whether there is a causal relationship between
asbestos and colorectal, laryngeal, esophageal, pharyngeal, or
stomach cancers. 69 The committee was chaired by Dr. Jonathan
67

§ 3274, § 121(e)
Id.
69
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS. ASBESTOS: SELECTED CANCERS
6-7 (2006). The development of the IOM analysis of “other cancers” is
described in Jonathan M. Samet, Asbestos and Causation of Non-Respiratory
Cancers: Evaluation by the Institute of Medicine, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1117
(2007) The decision to refer Level VI claims to the IOM was originally made
in 2003 and was not controversial thereafter. Accordingly, neither the
stakeholders nor the senators ever had an occasion to scrutinize rigorously the
68
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Samet of Johns Hopkins University (an eminent epidemiologist
with no previous connection to asbestos litigation) and issued its
report in June 2006. The committee found that there was
“sufficient” evidence of asbestos causation—the standard
envisioned by the sponsors of the bill—only in the case of
laryngeal cancer—which represents roughly 5 percent of the
cancers listed under Level VI. 70
While general causation of the various “other cancers” was
left to the experts at the IOM, the eligibility criteria for the
cancers that were found to be caused by asbestos were set forth
in the bill. These criteria were not based on medicine—how
could they be, when they applied to several different cancers
some of which might not be caused by asbestos at all? They
were based on settlement practices in the tort litigation. An
“other cancer” claimant could therefore recover by showing 15
weighted years of exposure plus the presence of non-malignant
asbestos-related disease (which could include either asbestosis or
pleural disease). 71 Both years of exposure and presence of a
standards that should be applied to evaluating cancer causation in the study.
For example, the level of evidence that ruled a cancer in or out was not made
clear, and the committee had to do its best with an ambiguous charge. As a
result, some Congressional staff raised what were basically policy questions
as to whether a cancer should be included in Level VI if there was merely
“suggestive” evidence of a causal relationship to asbestos. Id. at 1130.
Similarly, no one ever asked the IOM to decide what the appropriate medical
criteria would be if it found that asbestos was a general cause of a certain
kind of cancer. Such questions would have raised important policy issues that
could have made the basic strategy of the negotiators—deferring resolution of
the medical issue to a trusted medical expert—impossible. The essence of that
strategy was an attempt to transform a policy question into a technical one.
70
Id. According to the American Cancer Society, estimated new cases of
the “other cancers” included in Level VI for 2007 is 213,680, while the
estimate for laryngeal cancer was 11,300. American Cancer Society, Cancer
Facts and Figures 2007, at 4 (“Estimated New Cancer Cases and Deaths by
Sex for All Sites 2007”).
71
The FAIR Act weights exposure based on occupational setting and
when the exposure took place. Thus, for example, one year of exposure
working in shipyards in World War II is worth 4 years of exposure working
around asbestos in an ordinary setting. Moreover, exposures after 1986 are
weighted 1/10 and exposures from 1976 through 1986 are weighted 1/2
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non-malignant disease were indirect indicators that the claimant
had a great deal of exposure. No one argued that asbestosis or
pleural disease was an independent cause of any of these
cancers. In short, the logic behind the criteria was the logic of
settlement, not the logic of science.
Conservative skeptics thought that the absence of a scientific
basis for the Level VI criteria would allow many people whose
cancer was not caused by asbestos to qualify for payment.
Because some of the “other cancers”—especially colon cancer—
were quite prevalent, the skeptics worried that paying “false
positives” could undermine the financial viability of the
program, resulting in its collapse—and pressure for a federal
bailout. 72 This disquiet was exacerbated by the possibility that
changes in diagnostic technology—particularly developments in
CT scans and other imaging techniques—could make the
practical compromise reflected in the other-cancer criteria
unreasonable. This problem affects other medical categories as
well, especially Level VII lung cancers, and is discussed in Part
II (B)(4) below. 73

because increasingly stringent regulation reduced exposure levels over time.
See S. 3274, 109th Cong. § 121 (a) (16) (2006).
72
See American Cancer Society, supra note 70, at 4 (estimating the
incidence of new colon and rectal cancers in 2007 as 112, 340 and 41, 420,
respectively).
73
A second problem with Level VI was the possibility that criteria
workable in one institutional arrangement (the tort system and bankruptcy
trusts) might encourage a flood of new claims in a different arrangement (a
no-fault compensation scheme). See Charles E. Bates and Charles H. Mullin,
Analysis of S. 852 Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution (FAIR) Act 2
(2005) (“The Fair Act would create entitlements for many people with lung
and other cancers who were not compensated in the historical tort
environment.”). This possibility, while important for Level VI, is even more
important in Level VII (lung cancer claims without asbestosis). The problem
here is not necessarily that undeserving claims would be compensated, but
rather that a reduction in transaction costs in a no-fault administrative system
would greatly increase the rate of claiming (whether the medical criteria are
valid or not). This issue lies at the heart of concerns about the financial
viability of the program.
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3. Level VII—Lung Cancer without Asbestosis
It is generally agreed that lung cancer in a person who has
both extensive exposure to asbestos and asbestosis may be
attributed to the asbestos exposure. The FAIR Act addressed this
easy case in Level VIII—Lung Cancer With Asbestosis. The
controversy arises when the individual does not have asbestosis.
Experts argue over whether lung cancer can be attributed to
asbestos exposure only if asbestosis is diagnosed or whether
such an attribution can be made even in the absence of
asbestosis if exposure levels are high enough. 74 The FAIR Act
compromised. Level VII—lung cancer without asbestosis—
followed the more liberal view that the presence of asbestosis
was not an absolute prerequisite for a finding of causation—as
long as there was sufficient exposure. The bill adopted a
heightened exposure requirement (12 weighted years) and also
required pleural changes (which are a confirmation of exposure).
Then, in recognition of the fact that Level VII allows an award
with weaker evidence of causation, the bill reduced the award
value in Level VII (as compared to Level VIII).75 This
74

For the view that asbestosis is a prerequisite for attributing lung
cancer to asbestos exposure, see R. Jones, Asbestos Exposure and Thoracic
Neoplasms, SEMINARS IN ROENTGENOLOGY, v. XXVII, No. 2 94 (April
1992); W. Weiss, Asbestosis: A Marker for the Increased risk of Lung
Cancer Among Workers Exposed to Asbestos, 115 CHEST 536 (1998); Letter
of James R. Crapo to Sen. Jon Kyl (July 22, 2003), appendix E to Additional
Views of Sen. Jon Kyl, SEN. REP. 108-118, at 64-65 (2003). For the contrary
view see D. Egilman & A. Reinert, Lung Cancer and Asbestos Exposure:
Asbestosis is Not Necessary, 20 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 398 (1996); Consensus
Report, Asbestos, Asbestosis, and Cancer: The Helsinki Criteria for
Diagnosis and Attribution, SCAND. J. WORK. ENVIRON. HEALTH 1997; 23:
311, 314 (“Heavy exposure, in the absence of radiologically diagnosed
asbestosis, is sufficient to increase the risk of lung cancer.”).
75
For smokers, the value of a Level VII lung cancer claim is $300,000,
as opposed to $600,000 for a Level VIII claim. Previous versions of the
FAIR Act allowed lung cancer claimants to establish causation on the basis of
asbestos exposure alone, even in the absence of pleural changes confirming
actual exposure. S. 2290, 108th Cong. § 121 (d) (7) (2004); S. 1125, 108th
Cong. § 121 (d) (7) (2003) (reported). In a major concession to the
Republicans on the Judiciary Committee, however, Senators Specter and
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maneuver—reducing the claim value in return for less restrictive
eligibility criteria—is a hallmark of the settlement model. In
situations where causation is unclear, the medical model
suggests a very different approach: strengthening the eligibility
criteria and then paying those who pass the tighter criteria the
same amount of money as others with the same disease. The
medical model can only work, however, if Congress resolves the
scientific dispute over whether in fact lung cancer can be
attributed to asbestos if the claimant does not have asbestosis.
Congress does not have the expertise to resolve scientific
questions in that way, and so its instinct is to turn medical
questions into political questions, by way of compromise. 76
The FAIR Act’s treatment of lung cancers without asbestosis
was by far the most controversial eligibility issue. Getting the
lung cancer criteria wrong could have tremendous consequences.
The American Cancer Society estimates that 213,380 lung
cancers (114,760) in men) will be diagnosed in 2007. 77 If too
stringent, the lung cancer criteria could deprive many dying
people of compensation; if not stringent enough, the flood of
claims could doom the system.
Although the lung cancer question could not be resolved on
the basis of the medical model, the settlement model had its own
problems. In part the problem was due to the fact that exposure
reconstruction is expensive, time consuming, and uncertain.
Leahy agreed in spring of 2005 to delete the relevant medical category (the
“old” Level VII) from the current version of the bill. This concession
provoked the ire of some Senate Democrats, led by Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, who sought to restore the old Level VII category or at least allow
claimants who would have qualified under Level VII to bring asbestos claims
in the tort system. 152 Cong. Rec. S1265 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2006)
(amendment proposed by Sen. Kennedy).
76
Conservatives would have preferred to eliminate Level VII altogether,
thus in effect siding with those who believed that lung cancer cannot be
attributed to asbestos in the absence of asbestosis. However, too many
responsible experts disagreed with that conclusion to make that outcome
possible. But see Bailey v. Mobil Oil Corp., 187 S.W.3d 265 (Tex. App.
2006) (excluding expert testimony that a smoker’s lung cancer was due to
asbestos without a concomitant finding of asbestosis).
77
See American Cancer Society, supra note 70, at 4.
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Thus, eligibility cannot practically be premised on direct
estimates of exposure. In level VII, the drafters of the bill relied
on two indirect indicators of exposure—the number of years
spent in occupations characterized by exposure to asbestos
during particular periods and the presence of pleural changes.
These indicators were only roughly related to the threshold of
exposure that many experts thought was necessary for an
attribution of lung cancer to asbestos. Moreover, the prevalence
of pleural changes, in particular, depended on diagnostic
techniques, and a move from standard x-rays to CT scans had
the potential of greatly increasing the number of lung cancer
sufferer who could meet the bill’s criteria for compensation.
Since lung cancer values were thought to be high compared to
tort system values, there was a substantial concern that the Level
VII category might bankrupt the program.78
Interestingly, in 2005, the English also confronted the
problem of deciding whether and when lung cancers without
asbestos should be compensated as asbestos-related. The English
Industrial Injuries Benefits Scheme pays benefits to workers with
prescribed asbestos-related diseases. 79 In 2005, the Industrial
Injuries Advisory Council recommended a number of changes in
the program’s prescription for lung cancer (essentially, the

78

See C. Bates & C. Mullin, supra note 73. As is true of other scientific
issues, the number of people who would qualify for compensation under
Level VII was disputed. See Recent Developments in Assessing Future
Asbestos Claims Under the FAIR Act: Hearing before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statements of witnesses Douglas HoltzEakin,
Laura
Welch,
&
Denise
Martin),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1682. At the end of the day,
however, science could not resolve this argument. Opponents of the bill
wanted a level of certainty that no one could provide, because the
consequences of being wrong were so great and because they didn’t believe
that the safety valve provided by the bill’s sunset provisions would actually
work. Supporters, who assumed the bill would be implemented as written,
were prepared to rely on what they considered to be the preponderance of the
evidence.
79
See N.J. WIKELY, COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL DISEASE 60-65
(1993).
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eligibility criteria). 80 The Council found, first of all, that “where
asbestosis is present when lung cancer is diagnosed, the lung
cancer can be attributed with reasonable certainty to previous
asbestos exposure.” 81 Turning to the harder problem, it
concluded that a “substantial exposure” to asbestos doubled the
risk of lung cancer even in the absence of clinical evidence of
asbestosis. 82 Thus, the Council had to devise a practical way of
determining whether exposure was sufficiently “substantial” to
allow for compensation. One option would be to require
claimants to quantify their exposure, but the Council recognized
that that would not be workable in a scheme not “based on an
individual proof system.” 83 It also rejected the continued use of
diffuse pleural thickening as a criterion for a lung cancer award
because it thought diffuse pleural thickening was an “unreliable”
indicator of asbestos exposure. 84 The Council solved its problem
by selecting a limited number of jobs that typically involved
exposures to asbestos in amounts sufficient to double the risk of
lung cancer. 85 The Council’s recommendations were
80

DEPARTMENT FOR WORK & PENSIONS, ASBESTOS RELATED DISEASES:
REPORT OF INDUSTRIAL DISEASES ADVISORY COUNCIL 16-19 (July 2005). The
Government endorsed these proposed changes, see Department for Work &
Pensions, Press Release—Changes to the Schedule of Prescribed Diseases—
Asbestos Related Diseases (July 14, 2007), available at http://dpw.gov.uk/
mediacentre/pressreleases/2005/ju/cdis014.asp (last checked May 31, 2007).
The Advisory Council’s recommendations were implemented in April 2006.
See SI 2006/638, The Pneumoconiosis, Byssinosis, and Miscellaneous
Diseases Benefit (Amendment) Scheme 2006, at 2. The current list of
prescribed diseases is found at Department for Work & Pension, Guide to
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefits, Appendix 1: List of Diseases
Covered by the Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit at D8A, available at
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/advisers/db1/appendix/appendix1.asp (last checked
May 31, 2007).
81
Id. at 17.
82
Id. (emphasis added).
83
Id..
84
Id.
85
The eligible jobs were asbestos textile workers, asbestos sprayers,
asbestos insulation workers including those applying and removing asbestos
containing-material in shipbuilding. For exposures occurring before 1975,
workers must be in the listed occupation for 5 years; for exposure after that
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incorporated into the schedule of prescribed diseases in April
2006.
The British experience highlights the conceptual difficulty in
solving the lung cancer problem, even where it is not heavily
politicized. Congress had the same challenge, but less leeway.
The essential difficulty is to develop a satisfactory way to
measure exposure. There were a number of options. First,
Congress might have committed determinations of causation to
the discretion of Physicians Panels. This option, however, would
have made the operation of the lung cancer criteria completely
unpredictable and would have had no support from any quarter.
Second, Congress might have required more extensive pleural
changes to qualify for a lung cancer award. This expedient
would have preserved the basic structure of the act but moved
the threshold for recovery a bit more in the defendants’
direction. Because the connection between pleural changes and
lung cancer is somewhat arbitrary (as the Industrial Injury
Advisory Council found), this would not have responded
effectively to fears that lung cancers would destabilize the
finances of the program. Third, it could have adopted a
quantitative threshold for measuring cumulative past exposures.
That, however, would have had large transaction costs, and
since it would often be impossible to prove exposure with any
certainty, the program would have been under heavy pressure to
adopt presumptions or other expedients to ease the burden of
proof. And, finally, it could have followed the example of the
British Industrial Injuries Advisory Council in adopting a more
restricted list of the occupations and industries where
employment would give rise to an inference of occupational
exposure.
These options could have been used singly or in
combination. All would have presented policy problems, which
would quickly have become political problems. There simply
was no good solution to the lung cancer issue. The stakes were
too high; the outcome of the settlement model was too uncertain
when transferred to the administrative context; and the medical
time, 10-years’ employment in the listed job would be required. Id. at 19.

HANLON.DOC

1200

7/11/2007 6:24 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

disagreements were too deep. This issue was just too important
to be left to the doctors—and in fact no one ever suggested
referring the definition of the lung cancer medical criteria to the
IOM, which was Congress’s main vehicle for resolving other,
less critical scientific issues on the merits. Nor could the IOM
have executed that task without direction based on political
judgments which related to the very issues that made the
problem intractable to begin with.
4. The CT Scan Issue
In the discussion to this point, I have repeatedly referred to
the CT scan problem. This is a particular example of a more
general phenomenon. Technological change will inevitably lead
to more sensitive diagnostic techniques. In a medical model, that
is clearly desirable. If legislation is intended to compensate
people with a certain diagnosis, then better diagnostic techniques
necessarily constitute improvements in the program. What’s not
to like?
For several reasons the picture changes under a settlement
model. First, settlements are not judged on the basis of rigor
and consistency, but practical results. The practical result of
eligibility criteria depends on the diagnostic methods and
technology in place when the settlement is negotiated. If the
parties had contemplated a change in technology, they might
well have agreed on different terms, which might have included
stricter eligibility criteria. If this happens, improvements in
diagnostic techniques do not make the settlement better but
undermine its foundations.
This subversive effect is especially important when the
condition being diagnosed is not the disease that is being
compensated. This factor makes technological change especially
important in Level VI—Other Cancer and Level VII—Cancer
without Asbestosis. 86 In those categories, the disease being
86

While the defect of using pleural changes as a confirmation of
exposure is especially apparent in lung and other cancer cases, the same
problem also appears in the non-malignant categories. It is practically
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compensated is cancer. No one contends the pleural plaques in
themselves cause, or are a risk factor for, lung or other cancer.
The presence or absence of pleural plaques is a measurable
surrogate, or stand in, for a factor that is thought (at least by
some) to be causally related to these cancers – exposure to
asbestos. Moreover, the reason that settling parties have
traditionally looked at pleural plaques as a confirmation of
substantial exposure is not that there is a close relationship
between plaques and exposure, but rather there is a general
relationship and the parties understand what it means in terms of
the likelihood that claimants will be compensated. There is an
element of arbitrariness in using a sign in this way, but it is the
kind of arbitrariness that generally happens when parties engage
in settling controversies rather than resolving medical questions.
Rules of thumb of this kind are chosen because the line that is
drawn has understandable practical consequences: defendants
know how much they can expect to pay (given the prevalence of
plaques in the cases submitted to them) and plaintiffs’ counsel
are willing to accept the rule of thumb as a fair resolution given
what can be expected at trial. If, as a result of technological
advances, pleural changes came to be diagnosed more widely
(and presumably in cases of lesser exposure), the diagnosis
would be less useful in establishing a sufficient level of exposure
to cause cancer. In effect, it would be necessary to recalibrate
the settlement model. In the tort system, this problem would be
worked out over time in bargaining among the players, but in a
legislated compensation scheme, there is no such self-correcting
mechanism.
C. Exposure
All of the medical categories depend on proof of underlying
exposure, but no one really knows exactly how much exposure
impossible for pleural plaques by themselves to cause significant breathing
impairment. However, pleural changes could be an indication of asbestosis
that isn’t showing up on a chest x-ray, and that asbestosis might cause
impairment. Here again pleural changes are a partly arbitrary stand-in for the
real causative factor.
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any individual has. Unlike some radiation workers, who wear
badges that purport to measure their cumulative dose of
radiation, people exposed to asbestos did not have real-time
monitoring. Indeed, prior to the 1970s, effective monitoring of
asbestos concentrations in the work environment was
uncommon; and even if those concentrations were known,
precise information on where a person worked will be absent. 87
In litigation, the parties sometimes hire dose reconstruction
experts to try to model the asbestos exposures to which a worker
was subject. Obviously, however, an administrative
compensation scheme would break down if dose had to be
reconstructed by experts in this way. 88
Thus, the FAIR Act’s exposure standards were not based on
measured doses, but rather on inferences from information on
the industries where the claimant worked and the jobs he held. It
was critically important that information on employment history
be complete and detailed—if conclusory assertions regarding
employment were acceptable, the exposure criteria would cease
to be meaningful and the medical criteria for all of the disease
categories in the bill (other than mesothelioma) would be
undermined. S. 852 as reported was probably deficient in this
regard,
although
S.
3274
made
some
significant
87

There were no national regulations regarding exposure to asbestos
until OSHA adopted such regulations in 1971. Those regulation went through
a number of iterations, but very early on, in June 1972, OSHA required
workplace exposure monitoring. Because of this regulatory mandate,
exposure monitorng became widespread during the 1970s. On the history of
OSHA regulation of asbestos, see John F. Martonik et al., The History of
OSHA’s Asbestos Rulemakings and Some Distinctive Approaches that They
Introduced for Regulationg Occupational Exposure to Toxic Substances, 62
AIHAJ 208 & 211 Table II (2001).
88
Under the Energy Workers’ Compensation Program, reconstruction of
claimants’ radiation dose is a major source of delay. General Accountability
Office, Energy Employees Compensation: Many Claims Have Been
Processed, but Action Is Needed to Expedite Processing of claims Requiring
Radiation Exposure Estimates, GAO-04-958, at 17-21 (Sept. 10, 2004). That
is true, moreover, even though radiation workers subject to that program
wore badges that kept track of their exposure. Just reading the badges has
proved to be a time consuming procedure.
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improvements. 89
The second major exposure problem arises from the FAIR
Act’s focus on occupational exposure to asbestos. This is
perhaps an inevitable result of thinking in terms of the settlement
model. In the tort system, lawsuits based on non-occupational
exposure are very rare, and settlements typically do not address
such situations. 90 Moreover, the drafters assumed that all of the
diseases compensated under the FAIR Act, other than
mesothelioma, would require an amount of exposure that could
not in practice be satisfied except in an occupational setting.
What works, however, in the rough and ready world of tort
settlements does not necessarily work in a legislative scheme.
Non-occupational exposure was politically important for three
reasons.
First, at least some of the people exposed to asbestos from
the W.R. Grace vermiculite mine in Libby, Montana, were
exposed non-occupationally. The Libby situation was a cause
celebre which produced a prize-winning series of articles by
Andrew Schneider in the Seattle Intelligencer, a follow-on book,
and some gripping television in which Mr. Schneider incredibly
claimed that the main purpose of the FAIR Act was to address
the Libby experience. 91 While Libby might have been peripheral
89

Section § 121 (c) (2) in S. 3274, while continuing to allow claimants
to prove exposure by affidavit, would have required such affidavits to be
“detailed and specific.” Id. This combined with detailed submission
requirements relating to employment and exposure would provide the
Administrator with a sufficient record to evaluate allegations of exposure, and
§ 121 (c) (2) (C) allows him to require additional information if necessary.
None of this is perfect. Employment records typically show no more than the
fact of employment and (sometimes) occupation, and coworker testimony in
the asbestos context is not very reliable. The program would inevitably
depend on the claimant’s sworn testimony to some extent, and the hope of the
bill’s supporters was that the penalties for fraud combined with the need to
provide specific statements that could in principle be verified will keep false
statements down to a manageable level. Exactly the same problem bedevils in
the tort system, of course.
90
Take-home exposure is classified for this purpose, as it is under the
FAIR Act, as occupational exposure.
91
Libby, Montana is the site of a former W.R. Grace vermiculite mine
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to the asbestos litigation issue in general, it was not peripheral to
Montana’s senators, and Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) was one
of the main sponsors of the bill and a key to obtaining support
from Democrats.
Second, during the bill’s consideration the press in California
gave considerable play to the possibility that exposure to
naturally occurring asbestos there and in other states might cause
disease. 92 This was obviously of great concern to California
Senator Dianne Feinstein, another key supporter of the bill on
the Democrats’ side. 93
Third, the destruction of the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001, and the destruction of many buildings on
the Gulf Coast by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita released asbestos
from buildings that, it was feared, might someday cause
disease. 94
and processing center. The vermiculite produced at Libby contained tremolite
asbestos. Most people who were exposed to tremolite at Libby were exposed
on the job, but some were exposed in the community. Libby residents assert
that pleural conditions resulting from their exposure to tremolite are more
likely to be impairing than exposures to other forms of asbestos. The Libby
“story” was broken in a series of articles in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer in
the late 1990s. The authors of those articles subsequently developed and
updated their views in A. SCHNEIDER & D. MCCUMBER, AN AIR THAT KILLS
(2004). For more details on Libby and the provisions of the FAIR Act
relating to Libby, see Elegy, supra note 30, at 525-26.
92
See, e.g., C. Dahlberg, “Tracing asbestos victims is tough; It’s hard
to establish levels of health risk posed by naturally occurring minerals in
developing areas, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 10, 2005, Metro A1, at 1.
93
At Senator Feinstein’s request, the bill was amended in mark-up
(through a managers’ amendment) to add § 502, which contained extensive
regulatory provisions relating to naturally occurring asbestos, as well as §
121 (g) (10) (allowing people exposed to naturally occurring asbestos to file
an exceptional medical claim). See S. Rep. 109-97 (2005) at 45, 79.
94
As a result of concerns about asbestos at the World Trade Center cite
and in New Orleans, Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Mary Landrieu (DLA) proposed amendments, which were accepted by Senator Specter and
Senatory Leahy, that would give people who claimed to be injured by
asbestos from those two disasters the right to file an “exceptional medical
claim.” S. 3274, § 121 (g) (11). See also Senate Asbestos Bill Expands to
Include Hurricane, 9/11 Victims, http://safety.com/articles/senate-asbestos-
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The Senate did not feel comfortable excluding even the
possibility of an award for diseases other than mesothelioma in
any of these settings, just because exposure was not
occupational. 95 The solution adopted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in all of these cases was to underscore the authority
of Physicians Panels to adjudicate causation through the
exceptional medical claims procedure.
The three situations on which the Senate focused, however,
are just special instances of the general problem of community
exposure. The FAIR Act arguably should have been read in any
event to allow claimants to present a case on causation to
Physicians Panels in any non-occupational exposure case. The
bill did not, however, provide the panels any clear guidance on
how such cases should be decided (except in the case of Libby
exposures, where the bill clearly departed from any sensible
method for ascertaining causation in order to provide a special
benefit to that community). The settlement model basically failed
to provide any guidance for non-occupational exposures, because
there were very few settlements involving that situation. The
medical model was of little assistance because the medical issues
surrounding these kinds of exposure were contested and because

bill-expands-to-include-hurricane-9/11-victims.html. For the World Trade
Center, see, e.g., Sewall Chan, Hard To Tell What Causes Fatal Disease to
Lungs, NY Times, Feb. 13, 2007; Anthony DaPalma, Illness Persisting in
9/11 Workers, Big Study Finds, NY Times, September 6, 2006 (Health
Section). For New Orleans, see Sewall Chan & Matthew Wald, Storm &
Crisis: Overview, Officials Prepare for Partial Return of Residents, NY
Times, September 17, 2005 (News).
95
S. 852 contained a number of highly controversial special provisions
for people exposed to asbestos in Libby, Montana. See Elegy, supra note 30,
at 526. A key provision was to allow people who ever resided in or near
Libby to qualify for benefits to be determined by a Physicians Panel without
regard to occupational exposure. S. 852 § 121 (g) (8). The same approach
was subsequently applied to naturally occurring asbestos. S. 3274, § 121 (g)
(10). Several amendments pending on the floor when the bill failed (Nos.
2834 (Landrieu); 2877 (Clinton)) proposed relaxing the occupational exposure
requirement further in the case of the World Trade Center attack and natural
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. The substance of those amendments
eventually found their way into S. 3274. See S. 3274, § 121 (g) (11).
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Congress had no interest in cutting off claims in circumstances
that attracted a great deal of public attention if there existed even
a possibility that some claims would be valid. The obvious thing
to do was to punt the issue to the Physicians Panels.
Environmental exposure to asbestos is ubiquitous, however, and
leaving the question of causation to individual determination by
the Physicians Panels without providing any direction on how
causation was to be determined created an important uncertainty
about the operation of the act.
CONCLUSION
In the months leading up to the original introduction of the
FAIR Act in 2003, the asbestos litigation system had so
deteriorated from the defense point of view that there was an
unusual propensity to take a chance on a new system. This was
especially true for defendants, because financial markets were
largely closing for any company thought to have an “asbestos
problem.” By that time asbestos litigation had come to involve
around 8,400 companies, and many were afraid that their
potential asbestos liabilities might become economically lifethreatening. 96 But even insurers, who were somewhat less
vulnerable, considered asbestos litigation to be out of control
and were more willing than they had been previously to
contemplate a legislative option.
As time passed, however, this appetite for risk declined.
From the defense perspective, the tort system was significantly
improving every year. Many courts either formally or informally
deferred the cases of the unimpaired, and several states enacted
medical criteria bills. The interstate forum shopping that had
driven the post-Amchem explosion of asbestos claims abated.
Large scale consolidations stopped. And as a result of these and
other factors, including the increasing scandal that began to be
associated with asbestos litigation, filings plummeted. The
Manville Trust, for example, which received 93,764 domestic
cases in 2003, received only 16,607 in 2005—and most of that
96

RAND REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
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decrease was in the non-malignant category. 97 Defendants in the
tort system saw a similar, if less drastic, reduction in filings. 98
More and more companies were sanguine enough about the tort
system that they no longer felt compelled to endorse a radical
(and inherently unpredictable) change. At the same time, the
political process was steadily pushing up the cost of the
program. The viability of the FAIR Act depended increasingly
on how many claims, of what kind, would be filed under the
new system. And the answer to this question depended in large
part on the adequacy of the bill’s medical eligibility criteria.
Critical aspects of the medical criteria were surprisingly
uncontroversial. For example, the criteria separating Level I (the
unimpaired) from impaired claimants was little discussed,
although that line has been highly controversial in state medical
criteria legislation. Similarly, there was not much debate about
the criteria for non-malignant Levels III through V, which
covered steadily more impairing cases of asbestos related
disease. Nor was there any real controversy over the medical
criteria for mesothelioma. This general area of agreement,
however, left ample room for dissension.
Facing intractable medical issues, the sponsors of the bill
used three primary strategies. First, they referred some medical
issues to the IOM, which was a trusted, independent source of
medical expertise. The most important issue of this kind was a
determination of general asbestos causation for cancers other
than lung cancer and mesothelioma. More political medical
issues were, however, too “hot” to be referred to the experts
and were addressed in other ways.
Where a neutral medical determination was unattainable, the
Senate looked toward settlements in the private sector (including
bankruptcy trusts) as a model for developing standards of its
own. The settlement model was widely useful and resulted in
many of the areas of broad agreement. But, it did not provide an
adequate answer to the problem of lung cancer claims where
there is no underlying asbestosis. The problem was that there
97
98

Hanlon & Smetak, supra note 1, at 594.
Id..
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was an insufficient level of confidence that the FAIR Act’s
administrative system would behave like the tort system—
applying criteria that worked in an adversarial system with high
transaction costs could have unexpected consequences in a nonadversarial system with low transaction costs.
The settlement model similarly failed (but for different
reasons) in dealing with problems such as non-occupational
exposure that were very important politically, but had not been
important in the asbestos litigation. Here the Senate avoided
resolving the issues by delegating them to a Physician’s Panel,
but that was probably not a stable solution and would not have
been accepted in the (then-Republican) House of
Representatives. The problem was that the financial
consequences of decisions by Physicians Panels in cases of nonoccupational exposures where there essentially were no exposure
criteria were too large to tolerate.
It is hard to know whether the level of risk perceived by the
defense community in 2006 would have caused it to blanch in
2003. When the FAIR Act was first introduced, the tort system
was in such desperate shape that most defendants were prepared
to take some chances on an untried system. But as the tort
system improved (partly as a result of the pendency of the bill
itself, which reduced the incentive of plaintiffs’ lawyers to
recruit new cases), the burden of proof to be carried by the new
system steadily grew. One major reason for the failure of the
bill in 2006 was that the various ways adopted by the Senate to
resolve medical issues in an environment of extreme distrust on
scientific issues could not in the end sustain this growing
burden. Division in the business community, and a reduced level
of commitment even among businesses that supported the bill,
eventually created the political space in which the conservative
opponents, who disliked the bill for both political and
ideological reasons, could operate. In the end, these
conservatives, adding their voices to the opposition from that
part of the Senate that responded to the interests of trial lawyers
and their allies, brought on in the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre
of the FAIR Act.

